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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases that
apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references
are given for further research.
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1. ADMIRALTY
AN OWNER MUST ARBITRATE A CLAIM THAT A PARENT COMPANY
ASSIGNED TO ITS SUBSIDIARY WHEN THE OWNER CONTEMPLATED SUCH
ARBITRATION IN A CONTRACT WITH THE SUBSIDIARY

A parent company's insurer covered cargo that was lost due to
the sinking of a vessel chartered by a subsidiary company. The
insurance company filed a petition in the parent company's name
to compel arbitration of the loss by the shipowner based on an
arbitration clause in the charter contract. The district court refused to compel arbitration because the parent company's claim
was not a dispute between the shipowner and the charter party.
The insurance company then assigned its rights to the subsidiary
company in order to impose an obligation on the subsidiary to
assert the claim for the lost cargo against the shipowner. The subsidiary company filed a petition to compel the shipowner to arbitrate the loss. The district court granted the petition and the shipowner appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
ruling and held that a "dispute" within the meaning of the arbitration clause existed due to the unusual circumstances. According to
the court, the case was similar to an indemnity claim and the
shipowner would be liable for the amount of loss that arbitrators
determined to be caused by the shipowner's fault, because the
shipowner had bargained for the arbitration clause.
Significance-This decision enforces the intention manifested in
an arbitration clause to a contract between a subsidiary company
and a shipowner, despite the rule that a non-arbitrable claim does
1029
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not become arbitrable through assignment. CaribbeanSteamship
Co. v. Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S., 598 F.2d 1264 (2d Cir.
1979).
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT WILL WITHSTAND VACATUR MOTION EvEiN
WHEN OBTAINED AFTER ARBITRATION HAS COMMENCED

Plaintiff shipowner obtained attachment under Rule B(1) of the
Supplemental Rules to secure its claim for demurrage, then pending in London arbitration called for by the charter party. Defendant charterer moved for vacatur. First, defendant contended that
the subject of the dispute, charterer's guarantee to pay demurrage
due from the cargo receiver upon the latter's failure, was not a
maritime contract because it was expressed in a side letter executed one day after the charter party. Second, defendant argued
that Rule B(1) was used by plaintiff merely to obtain security
during arbitration, whereas the Rule's primary purpose was acquisition of in personam jurisdiction. Third, the defendant charterer urged vacatur on the ground that the United States Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208, does not authorize attachment in conjunction
with arbitration. The district court denied the motion for vacatur.
Concerning the side letter, the court noted a provision in the
charter party itself that appeared to make the charterer liable for
all demurrage, and held that such an ambiguity must be resolved
in favor of the dispute's characterization as arising from a maritime contract. Second, the court found no abuse of Rule B(1),
holding that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 8, expressly
provided for initiation of arbitration by seizure, with the court
retaining jurisdiction to enter a decree after the arbitral award. In
The Anaconda v. American Sugar Refining Co., 322 U.S. 42 (1944),
the Supreme Court noted a congressional intent in this provision
to afford a statutory security mechanism during arbitration. In the
instant case, however, the district court extended the meaning of
§ 8 of the Act to allow attachment after foreign arbitration had
already begun. Third, the court followed Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie., S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
holding that the Convention's silence on attachment in conjunction with arbitration was not inconsistent with the Act's seizure
provision. Significance-This is the first case to consider whether
attachment may be obtained under the Act purely for security
after the initiation of arbitration. Paramount Carriers Corp. v.
Cook Industries, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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2. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
UNITED NATIONS EMPLOYEES NOT ACCORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN
CASES OF ESPIONAGE; RECAPTURE OF STOLEN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
FROM DIPLOMAT DOES NOT VIOLATE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Two Soviet citizens, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, were indicted for espionage against the United States and
moved for dismissal on the ground that they were entitled to diplomatic immunity under 22 U.S.C. § 252, 18 U.S.C. § 288, and the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The trial court held
that no immunity existed and ruled that defendants were not
"public ministers" protected by 22 U.S.C. § 252 and that employees of international organizations were insulated from prosecution
by 18 U.S.C. § 288 only for acts falling within their official functions. Additionally, the court ruled that such employees were not
"diplomatic agents" immunized by Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. Defendants also moved to suppress evidence that had
been seized from the person of a third Soviet citizen whom the
United States conceded to be entitled to diplomatic immunity,
and who was therefore not a defendant in the case. Although originally granted, upon a Government motion for reconsideration, the
court denied defendants' motion to suppress. The court concluded
that the congressional intent expressed in 22 U.S.C. § 252 was not
meant to preclude the recapture of national defense information
stolen by a diplomat. The court then considered a possible inconsistency between such a conclusion and its earlier ruling that the
diplomat's detention violated the express exemption of Article 29
of the Vienna Convention. The court found that the law of nations
would not contemplate rendering a receiving State helpless to prevent the transportation of highly classified information across its
borders. The Convention was therefore viewed as consistent with
the statute with regard to such information. Conversely, the court
ruled that seizure of the incriminating container surrounding the
classified information, did occasion a detention in violation of Article 29. The court, however, declined to apply the exclusionary rule
to what on reconsideration it characterized as a diplomatic problem for the executive and legislative branches. Significance-This
decision is the first to consider inconsistency between United
States statutory diplomatic immunity and the more recent Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. United States v. Enger, 472
F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978).

1032

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:1029

3. EXTRADITION
UNITED STATES EXTRADITION TREATY APPLICABLE TO ALL ENUMERATED CRIMES REGARDLESS OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED

Canada sought to extradite respondent, a United States citizen,
under the provisions of the Treaty of Extradition Between the
United States and Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983 (1976) (Treaty). The
Treaty provides for extradition of individuals convicted of certain
crimes punishable in both the United States and Canada by a term
of at least one year. Respondent argued that the Treaty could not

be applied to his offense because: (1) he was sentenced to a term
of less than one year; (2) the formal extradition documents, while
received by the Department of Justice within the forty-five day
period required by the Treaty, were not filed with the court until
after the forty-five day period had elasped; and (3) the Canadian

o government had breached a plea bargain arrangement. Rejecting
respondent's contentions, the court limited the scope of the extradition hearing to an ascertainment of whether the Treaty applied
and whether the evidence of criminal conduct was sufficient to
warrant extradition. Finding that these requirements had been
met, the court directed the issuance of a warrant for respondent's
extradition. The court, reasoned that the Treaty included all offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one year,
regardless of the sentence imposed. Respondent's offense thus fell
within the scope of the Treaty. The court further stated that the
Treaty only required that the court of the asylum country receive
the extradition documents within forty-five days of the extradition
request. The purpose of the Treaty, according to the court, was to
protect the asylum country and individuals from unnecessary delays by the requesting country. The court also stated that a court
should refrain from interfering with the judicial processes of another country in order to avoid violating the comity underlying
international extradition. Significance-This decision interprets
the Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and Canada
to include all offenses for which a sentence greater than one year
may be imposed, regardless of the actual sentence. United States
v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
4. INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGULATION
MOTION REQUESTING BENEFIT OF FOREIGN PATENT IN PATENT INTERFERENCE ACTION IS PROPER WITHOUT SUPPORTING STATEMENT OF REASONS WHEN OPPONENT CAN FAIRLY RESPOND

In a patent interference action, the party declared to be junior
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based on a later United States filing date sought to shift the burden of proof by a motion under 37 CFR 1.231(a)(4) for the benefit
of the date of an earlier Czechoslovakian application. The interference examiner granted the senior party's motion to strike, finding
that the junior party failed to comply in a timely manner with 37
CFR 1.231(b), which required "reasoning" in support of the motion. Since the motion was not transmissible to the primary examiner for consideration, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
Board of Patent Interferences refused the junior party's request for
a final hearing pursuant to 37 CFR 1.225. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that a final hearing pursuant
to 37 CFR 1.225 required only a "proper" motion under 37 CFR
1.231. The junior party motion was "proper" because it stated that
the foreign application described the same invention contained in
the United States application, thereby notifying the opposing
party and satisfying 37 CFR 1.231(b) without further "reasoning."
On petition for rehearing, the court revoked the determination that
the specific error was refusal to set the case down for final hearing,
recognizing the PTO interest in continuing with prescribed internal procedures. The court rejected any PTO interest in consistent
interpretation of a "proper" motion as a motion which has been
filed, transmitted by the interference examiner to the primary examiner, and decided by the primary examiner. Such interpretation
would be inconsistent with 37 CFR 1.231(d), which makes
"proper" motions transmissible, and 37 CFR 1.244, which allows
the primary examiner to decide "proper" motions that have not
been transmitted. The instant junior party was not required to file
a petition under 37 CFR 1.244 because its effort to have the case
set down for final hearing under 37 CFR 1.225 denied
"acquiescence" in the interference examiner's error.
Significance-The PTO interference practice will not be accommodated when PTO interpretation of its own regulations jeopardizes the junior party's due process rights. Peska v. Satomura, 602
F.2d 969 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
5.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

DIsMIssAL VIA FORUM NON CONVENIENS PROPER IN Surr BY FOREIGN
NATIONALS WHEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS STRONGLY FAVOR
THE DEFENDANT

Plaintiffs decedents, four Norwegian residents, were killed in a
crash off the Norwegian coast in a helicopter manufactured by the
defendant, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiffs brought a products
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liability action in Delaware under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Defendant
moved to dismiss on the basis that Norway was clearly the more
convenient and logical forum for the suit. Defendant maintained
that the wreckage, investigations, operational and maintenance
records, and witnesses for the measure of potential damages were
located in Norway. Additionally, defendant argued that potential
defense witnesses could not be compelled to testify in Delaware.
Defendant asserted that an action could be maintained in Norway
and that the defendant would assent to such suit and Would produce all its records relevant to the litigation at its own expense.
The court granted defendant's motion, finding that Norway was a
suitable forum and that a balance of the private interest of convenience and of the public interest strongly favored this situs. In addition to the obvious greater number of evidentiary connections with
Norway (private interests), the court reasoned that applying the
Delaware choice of law principles for the negligence theory of liability would lead to the application of Norwegian substantive law
(public interest). Significance-This decision delineates the application of private and public interest analysis for determining if
dismissal on a motion for transfer to a more convenient forum is
proper. Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 472 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Del. 1979).
NATURALIZED UNITED STATES CITIZEN IS BARRED FROM USING THEORY

OF "DuAL NATIONALITY" TO INVOKE DIvERSITY JURISDICTION
Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen of the United States residing in
California, who is considered a citizen of the United Kingdom
under British law, brought suit in federal district court for breach
of contract and tort violations against defendants, United States
citizens residing in California, asserting diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction based upon plaintiff's alleged "dual nationality." Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court granted dismissal holding that plaintiff is only
a citizen of the United States, regardless of his status under British
law, because naturalized citizens take an oath renouncing their
foreign allegiance. Alternatively, accepting plaintiff's argument of
"dual nationality," diversity jurisdiction is inappropriate because
the parties are both United States citizens and residents of the
same state. Considering the policies underlying diversity jurisdiction, the court found no reason to expect bias in state courts when
all parties are residents of the forum state. Furthermore, as long
as the party asserting jurisdiction is a United States citizen, it is
unlikely that a foreign government will be affronted by a decision
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adverse to that citizen. Acceptance of the rule proposed by plaintiff would grant naturalized citizens nearly unlimited access to the
federal courts while native-born citizens are denied such general
access. The court found Aguirre v. Nagel, 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D.
Mich. 1967), unpersuasive, which held that a minor plaintiff born
in the United States of foreign parents was a citizen of the foreign
state as well as the United States and could properly assert diversity jurisdiction. Significance-Thisdecision denies favored treatment to naturalized citizens as compared to native-born citizens
in diversity jurisdiction claims by refusing to consider allegations
of dual citizenship. Raphael v. Hertzberg, 470 F. Supp. 984 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).

